05.11.2015

Russia, Syria and the supposed war against the “Islamic State”

Which reactions do the Russian Muslims have to the air raids in Syria?

© S Nazari via Flickr

A little bit more than a month ago, Russia joined the “war against Islamic State” and started carrying out air raids in Syria. The military operation has divided the Russian Muslims, raising questions about how to deal with IS-sympathizers in their own country. This could have consequences for Vladimir Putin.

by Sarah Reinke

Russia has been carrying out attacks on targets in Syria since September 30. Before, President Putin had gotten permission from the Federation Council, Russia’s upper house, which consists of two representatives for each of Russia’s regions. The senators unanimously decided that the Russian army should be allowed to operate outside the state territory. Not even one of the 130 representatives voted against the plan, and nobody asked why the Russian army should actually be involved in a conflict in Syria. Lew Schlosberg, chairman of the Yabloko party in Pskov (a city in northwest Russia) is furious about this. In his article “Vladimir Putin has decided to return to the highest political level – on the blood of Russian soldiers”, he warns that this mission could be very dangerous for Russia. Putin’s central motif is to secure and to extend his own power – and not, as he claims, to fight the “Islamic State” (IS). He takes a lot of risks: fallen Russian soldiers, surely – as in eastern Ukraine – but also dead Syrian civilians and incalculable consequences of his politics in his own country.

Many Muslims are critical about Russia’s activities in Syria

Even if Putin’s “carrot-and-stick”-politics were enough to align the religious dignitaries of the Orthodox Christians and the Muslims to the state policy, there are critical voices against the intervention in Syria, placing emphasis on negative consequences for Russia. The peace between the different religious communities and (often coinciding) the ethnic groups is fragile. The conflicts concerning a “traditional versus a non-traditional Islam” and the various interpretations of Islam reflect the differences between the Muslim population groups in Russia and the state. In most of the Republics, for example, it is not allowed to wear a veil in public, while it is even mandatory for women in Chechnya. Under the pretext of fighting “extremism”, there have been many raids against Muslims in recent years. Some voices even spoke of targeted persecution against the Muslim population. Russia’s military intervention in Syria could revive these conflicts. Official representatives of the Muslim regions are eager to assure their support – especially Ramzan Kadyrov, the infamous dictator in Chechnya and one of Putin’s most loyal allies, who offered to deploy 20,000 special forces for ground operations – while the 20 million Muslims in Russia are deeply divided. About 90 percent of them are Sunnis. Because Putin’s allies in Iraq, Iran and Syria are Shiites and Alawites, there are several posts in social networks calling the president “Putin the Shiite”. Thus, it is not surprising that the Sunni Muslims are against Russian military operations in Syria.

Nearly 20 million people in Russia belong to Islam. The bombing of Syria and the allies of Putin in the fight against "Islamic State" have split the predominantly Sunni Muslims in the country.

The operations in Syria awaken traumatic memories of the disastrous intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan: There were about one million victims, and about 60,000 Russian soldiers are believed to have been killed in action between the outbreak of war in 1979 and its end in 1989. Thousands of villages were destroyed, and 5.5 million Afghans were forced to flee. This war has contributed significantly to the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is fear of being drawn into a conflict with many victims once again. In the North Caucasus, the memories of the two devastating wars in Chechnya are still quite fresh – and many fear another military deployment because of the expected suffering and other negative consequences for the civilian population. Simply put, many are against another war due to humanitarian reasons.

“Bring the Circassians back home!”

The Circassians, most of whom are Muslims, are observing the tensions in the Middle East closely. They are worrying about their compatriots: About 100,000 are said to have been living in Syria before the war broke out in 2011. Now, Deir Ful (which is also inhabited by Circassians) was one of the three villages that was attacked by Russian military aircraft on the first day of the attacks in Syria. The inhabitants are refusing to bow to both Bashar al-Assad and the IS. The air raids are to be seen as a punishment for opposing Assad, because there would be no other plausible reason why Circassians should be attacked in the scope of fighting IS. Russia should remember that the Circassians living in Syria are descendants of the victims of genocide crimes committed by the Russian Tsarist army in the Caucasus region in 1861. Around one million Circassians were forcibly relocated from Sochi to the Ottoman Empire across the Black Sea. Thousands lost their lives on their way to Turkey. The survivors had to resettle in different areas of the Ottoman Empire which belong to present-day Turkey and Syria. When the war broke out in Syria, many wanted to return to their ancestors’ homeland – but that’s hardly possible: The Russian authorities are not issuing visas authorities, and they refuse to accept more than only a very small number of Circassians from Syria. If they manage to escape, they are totally dependent on help by their compatriots – concerning housing, jobs and other support – which, however, is often not sufficient. Recently, there has also been resistance in the Circassian-inhabited republics of the North Caucasus. On October 7, 2015, the largest demonstration of the Circassians so far was held in Cherkessk, the capital of the Republic of Karachay-Cherkessia. The posters of the approximately 200 participants read slogans such as “Bring the Circassians back home!” or “Russia, save the Circassians in Syria!”. The Russian government simply ignored the demonstrations – as well as a number of past Circassian initiatives. Now, Circassian inhabitants of the refugee camps in Turkey are planning another joint attempt to appeal to the Russian embassies and also the EU. More people should be saved by admitting them to the Northwest Caucasus. More protests are to be expected in Russia in case further villages of the Circassians and other North Caucasian nationalities in Syria are hit by Russian bombs.

Circassians in Russia want to help their compatriots in Syria, but the Russian authorities prevent this. [Image icon]

Russia “exports” radical Muslims to the Middle East

Not only the Circassians, but almost all Muslims – especially from the North Caucasus and from the Central Asian Post-Soviet States – have been under pressure from the authorities, intelligence agencies and the government for many years. The relationship between the Russian government and the Muslim population is tense. On the one hand, President Putin recently attended the opening of a new mosque in Moscow, while, on the other hand, there are more and more raids against Muslims. This makes the Muslim population feel estranged from the government and all state authorities, especially the younger generation. In search for a Muslim identity and recognition, they orient themselves towards cultural, religious and societal values of the Middle East. Influenced by imams from these regions who preach in the North Caucasus, or by young Muslims of Russian origin who graduated at universities in the Middle East, they turn to a new interpretation of Islam which they cannot live out in Russia. This causes a spiral that increases sympathies for IS. According to Alexei Malashenko of the Carnegie Center Moscow, more than half a million Russian Muslims could be supporters of IS. According to official figures, there are already 2,400 Russian citizens fighting for IS, while other sources estimate up to 7,000.

In Russia, it became a criminal offense to join the “Islamic State” in February 2015. However, the government has done nothing much to stop Russian Muslims from heading to Syria in order to join the ranks of the IS. On the contrary: There are signs that this exodus from the North Caucasus is not only tolerated, but even welcomed – true to the motto that people who are fighting in Syria or Iraq won’t be causing trouble in Russia. Thus, according to research by the renowned Novaya Gazeta, employees of the Russian secret service FSB are supposed to have met with members of the Dagestani Islamist underground in the village Novosasitl, promising the fighters passports and an unimpeded journey through Turkey to Syria. This is particularly cynical – and it doesn’t help to solve the pressing social, economic and especially political problems of the North Caucasus, nor does it help to stop the crimes against the population of Syria. Instead, Russia might simply be trying to export murderers. Here, of course, there is also a debate about how to prevent radicals who want to join the IS or any other Islamist group from leaving the country. However, Russia’s way of dealing with opposition forces proves that the Russian authorities have many options: restricting the freedom of movement in the country, for example, especially the emigration of its citizens. Also, there are ways to control the Internet. So why were so many of the IS-propaganda videos in Russian freely available in Russia for so long?

At the same time, there are repeated warnings about the return of supposedly thousands of IS fighters with passports from the successor states of the Soviet Union. Especially the situation in the North Caucasus could deteriorate again. According to Alexei Malashenko of the Carnegie Center, this is the reason why officials traveled from Dagestan to Syria; to convince their countrymen to continue fighting in Syria and not return home. This is not about investigating the causes of radicalization, especially of the younger generation in Russia, or to offer alternatives. Instead, there are attempts to coax “troublemakers” into leaving the country and to eliminate the potential danger of repatriates from Syria before it arises. There were rumors about such returnees in Chechnya, especially in summer 2015. Chechnya’s ruler, Ramzan Kadyrov, immediately spread the word that three IS-fighters had been killed 2015 in a special operation in Grozny on October 8. They were said to have planned a “series of terrorist attacks” in Grozny. His statement raises doubts, which Radio Free Europe summarized in an article: Why did the Chechen security forces not arrest the fighters earlier? How could the alleged terrorists be identified so fast? Why did these “IS fighters” not carry out the attacks that were planned for October 5 and 7? And why are they still in the city? It is to be feared that the “war against IS” in Russia and especially in the North Caucasus will be used as a pretext for further repression – not only against suspected terrorists but against society as a whole.

While passports and a safe journey through Turkey to Syria is in part assured to IS sympathizers from the Russian secret service FSB, "the fight against IS" serves primarily as an excuse to tighten repression against Muslims in Russia.

The West must not bend to Putin

Vladimir Putin’s plan will not work out. Some day, the Russian population will have enough of his attempts to secure his power and influence on the backs of the suffering Syrian civilians, the Russian soldiers and the remains of the Russian civil society. However, it might take too long until he reaches his limits in Russia itself. Putin’s secret service is too strong, the country is characterized by fear and arbitrariness. The Russian Muslims – who belong to many ethnic groups such as the Tatars, the Circassians, Chechens or Bashkirs – have very different opinions: Some sympathize with IS and will even travel to Syria, partly with the help of the Russian secret service, in order to join the radical Islamists. Some, however, don’t want a war – often based on own experiences, such as in Chechnya. Others are not willing to support the Shiite regime in Iran or Iraq, and still others rightly fear to be the next victims of state violence in Russia. They know that the government will turn against anything or anyone seen as a threat: Muslims, committed NGOs or independent, courageous journalists. For this reason, to protect the Russian civil society itself, it is so important that the West will not bend to Putin. His inhumane deals, his playing with the lives of thousands, must be prevented.

 

[About the author]

SARAH REINKE is head of the STP's office in Berlin and consultant for the CIS countries. She has a profound knowledge about the situation of minorities in this region, constantly maintains contact with victims and gives them a voice.


Header Photo: S Nazari via Flickr

 

This post was translated from German.