23.01.2006

Evo President: A revolution with the ballot form

Bolivia

Evo Morales after the election

The next president of Bolivia will be Evo Morales! He is not only the first indigenous person in this office – but also the president moving into the Palacio Quemado who has drawn the most votes in the democratic history of Bolivia (prior to him the highest vote was achieved by "Goni” Sanchez de Lozada, who received in the year 1993 35.5%). The present final figure lies at 54%, with the second, Jorge "Tuto” Quiroga, lying 25 points behind! This is something approaching a revolution with the ballot form, which will certainly have a signal function on the region.

"We have achieved a historic record with the votes. I am telling the Aymaras, Quechuas, Guaraníes and Chiriguanos that we are for the first time furnishing the president”, said Morales after his election victory. The farmer’s son from the Aymara people was born on 26.10.1959 in Lasllave, near the mining town of Oruro on the almost 4000 meter high Altiplano. He grew up in poverty. When he was called up to the army his family went to the tropical low lands of the Chapare to grow coca. The Morales family was part of a regular wave of migration. This was caused by constant droughts, frost and the opening of the markets in the neo-liberal structure reform of 1985 for products from the climatically more favoured neighbouring countries. The collapse of mining at the same time sealed the matter. Most of the migrants were Quechuas, followed by Aymara. They displaced and assimilated the Yuqui and Yuracaré who were living in the forests as hunters, collectors and fishermen. The saw themselves less as indigenous people, more as farmers and miners.

The revolution of 1952 had turned the Indians into "farmers” and organised them into sindicatos (trade unions). The sindicatos of the miners saw themselves as the avant-garde of the proletariat. The revolution had introduced universal suffrage. But its concept of the citizen was also directed against the autonomous collective of the traditional village communities in the Andes. The land reform of 1953 was directed against the big landowners and gave the land to "those who cultivate it” – but also against the traditional collective ownership and ways of using it, such as in the times before the Incas. To put it in the words of the sociologist Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui: " The human rights of the Indios were only recognized when they ceased being Indios.” Nevertheless; the collective of the Andes lived on in the culture of resistance, precisely in the sindicato itself.

In the agrarian and ecological context of the Chapare, which was foreign to them, the new settlers found themselves faced by very many challenges: matters of ownership had to be regulated, forest cleared, here a well, there an access road built, a school built etc. In the absence of state structures the sindicatos were founded, which were de facto forms of government. To this day they still control 80% of the land and can withdraw the rights of usage if the land has been unused for more than three years. Decisions are made in the sindicatos and by unanimity. With the coca boom the sindicatos temporarily lost their significance, to regain it in the battle against the policies of destroying coca. The organised themselves into centrales and these made up in turn six federaciones. In 1991 these created a coordination committee, of which Evo Morales was elected to the chair. With road blocks and protest marches to La Paz, which lastied for weeks, they forced several governments to concessions, which were mostly ignored, since La Paz is in this regard under great pressure from Washington. The result has been an increased political awareness, which has also been more radical, with the rediscovery of their own indigenous identity, which had never been lost, but which had got pushed into the background. When today the ampliado (the general assembly) meets in Chapare there are the representatives of 36 centrales (local associations), which themselves represent more than 600 sindicatos. The principle is that of unanimity.

With the Ley de la Participación Popular (the Law of General Participation) of 1994 there were communities created in Bolivia with their own legal beings and their own budgets. The councillors and mayors were subject to far-reaching control from the grass roots. Yet they had to stand for election on the lists of the political parties. The sindicatos of the coca farmers used the small splinter group of the Izquierda Unida, IU, (United Left Party) and won. All Chapare mayors were former sindicato officials. At the parliamentary elections of 1997 the IU won four seats in Bolivia but all direct mandates and all from the Chapare, among them Evo Morales with 69%.

Since in accordance with the electoral law only candidates from the list of political parties were admitted, the coca farmers decided to found their own party: MAS, Movimiento al Socialismo – Instrumento Político para la Soberanía de los Pueblos (Movement towards Socialism – an Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Communities). This movement stands aside from the old discredited parties, which are seen as the tool of a narrow national upper class in the service of foreign powers, it sees itself as a "political instrument for the sovereignty of the peoples”. MAS filled a vacuum in the political system of Bolivia and changed suddenly from being the only political instrument for the coca farmers to the crystallisation point for the dissatisfied in the country. The richest 10% of the population has 32% of the national income, 82% of the people are poor. At the parliamentary elections of 2002 the MAS became immediately the strongest party. The top-ranking candidate Evo Morales was the runner-up for the presidency, but he lost. However together with the smaller, more radical movement Indigena Pachacutic (MIP) of Felipe Quispe 41, mainly Indio fundamental opponents moved into Congress.

Instead of recognizing the signs of the times the attempt was made to keep the parliamentary newcomers out. The pressure from the streets increased. And the MAS has increasingly had to bow to this pressure. In October 2003 a rising of the people drove the president, Sanchez de Lozada, from office and from the country. In June 2005 his vice-president and successor, the independent historian and journalist Carlos D. Mesa, gave up under the pressure of mass protests.

Bolivia is seen today as a country on the verge of being ungovernable. The army has up till now remained surprisingly neutral and a support of democracy. Paradoxically the MAS was for a long time the most important support of President Mesa in Parliament. Morales is now faced by great challenges. The appointment of a Constitutional Assembly (Constituyente) is due in July. Bolivia is caught up in a tug-of-war between nationalisation of the energy resources and the attempts at secession on the part of the provinces of Santa Cruz and Tarija, which have themselves plentiful energy resources. The expectations of the poor and marginalized population are great, but the (financial) margins for action are limited. And the radical opposition around the Trade Union Congress COB, Felipe Quispe’s MIP and the neighbourhood committees of the satellite town of El Alto are impatient.

The electoral victory of the MAS has not only caused the disappearance of the political representatives of the old model. The ADN and MIR have ceased to exist as parties, the traditional Movimiento Revolucionaria MNR, the support of the revolution of 1952 and the neo-liberal structural adjustments under the president Estenssoro and Sanchez de Lozada, received only 6.4% of the votes. Felipe Quispe’s radical Indio MIP has disappeared for the moment into insignificance with 2.1% of the votes. Here lies a great chance. Bolivia is longing for an end to the polarisation and unrest. The "clash of cultures” must give way to a "dialogue of cultures”. The Constituyente, which is due to meet on 2nd July, would be a good meeting-place. Whether or not the MAS is sufficiently covered with personnel and programme in order to overcome these challenges, is a matter on which there is much speculation. Yet – the men and women who went to the polling-booths have entrusted the young movement with precisely this task…

Evo Morales was until recently a bugbear for all western politicians, but now after the vote there is no overlooking him. The USA had threatened to freeze all aid for Bolivia in the case of a victory of the MAS, but this promptly brought additional votes for Morales. Now Washington is making its attitude dependent on the behaviour of the new government. Expectations are that democracy will be respected and existing obligations and agreements kept. This is a clear threat, particularly with regard to drug politics and the destruction of coca. The European Union has by contrast signalised for a start its preparedness to cooperate without voicing any objections. Governments which are seen as "progressive” in neighbouring countries like Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela expressly welcome the result of the polls. Bolivia is an aid regime. Development finance from abroad makes up some 8-10% of the gross domestic product and finances almost 100% of the public spending. This is not desirable, but a consequence of the old model. Bolivia will also be in need of support in the future. And the international community will be wise to work constructively with the new government. It is vital to ensure that society does not fall apart and that a balkanisation does not take place. The result of the elections should give food for thought. Since it is also a letdown for those development organisations and their theorists who have largely supported and financed the old model.

FOR THE DECRIMINALISATION OF THE COCA-LEAF

Robert Lessmann

"In March1995 Evo Morales was in Vienna at the invitation of the Society for Threatened Peoples to give evidence at the 38th meeting of the International Narcotic Drugs Commission of the United Nations for the decriminalisation of the coca-leaf. We quote here extracts of his speech to the UN forum:

"Mr President, I am here as a delegate of the Society for Threatened Peoples and as a representative of millions of farmers, indigenous peoples and consumers of the coca-leaf who are concerned about the trade, use and misuse of the drug and the socio-cultural development of our peoples. I am here to suggest a correction to an historical mistake, which was committed in this Commission and in the World Health Organisation 40 years ago.

First of all we should like to assure you that we are against the misuse of drugs in the countries of the north and in our countries. Secondly we should like to emphasise that the coca farmers, men and women, are outright foes of the drug trade. Bolivia has since 1987 voluntarily reduced the cultivation area for coca by 26,000 hectares and thus renounced many million dollars – which proves how seriously it takes the fight against the drug trade. However the producers have found with the so-called alternative development no satisfactory reply. Participation in these programmes has proved to be an economic failure. In the so-called war against drugs however it is the Quechua, Aymara and Guarani who were the first to be arrested and killed.

In the third place we are convinced of the necessity to put a stop to the misuse of drugs and the expansion of the drug trade. But we are against the intervention of police and army as this is primarily an economic, socio-cultural and political problem.

In the fourth place we want to examine the last twenty years of the fight against drugs on the national and international levels, which has clearly had no effect.

The diversity of opinion in this complex matter is healthy. It would however be healthier if we were allowed to take part in this debate, which concerns our life and our fate. For the countries of the north decide on measures which are of advantage to them, while we are left with the disadvantages.

We do not agree with the coca-leaf being lumped in this discussion together with the drugs …coca is not cocaine, a coca producer is not a drug dealer and coca consumers are not drug addicts.

More than the war on drugs we need a struggle against poverty in the sense of a lasting development on the basis of the biodiversity of our countries. Our holy coca-leaf is a fundamental part of it.

For this reason we consider it unjust that the coca-leaf be placed in the list of narcotic substances.”

The leaves of the coca bush have a tradition among the peoples of the Andes going back many thousands of years: as a nutritional supplement (they contain among other substances protein, carbo-hydrates, iron, calcium, phosphorus, vitamin A1, B2 and E), as a stimulant (they contain cocaine and ecgonine) and in magical rites at religious ceremonies. But they are on List 1 of the controlled substances of the Narcotic Drugs Convention of the United Nations of 1961. 300-500 kg of coca-leaves are needed to isolate one kilogram of cocaine-hydrochloride in a chemical process requiring several stages. The Vienna Convention of 1988 allowed the cultivation and consumption of coca-leaves in areas where this has a history, as in Peru and Bolivia. Peruvian law allows this in certain circumstances, the Bolivian in certain areas. For the rest the signatory states at the convention of 1961 commit themselves to wiping out the cultivation and consumption of the leaves within 25 years.

The visits of representatives of the coca farmers – mostly Quechua and Aymara – at the United Nations in Vienna, which were made possible by the Society for Threatened Peoples are linked with the so-called coca-diplomacy, which has been concerned since the beginning of the 1990s to remove the coca-leaf from this list of forbidden substances. This would take the weight of repression off the shoulders from the indigenous farmers and enable legal marketing of coca-based products on the world market, such as tea, chewing-gum, toothpaste, medicines and soft drinks. The Bolivian Minister of the Interior Saavedra Bruno had two years before Morales at the 36th Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the United Nations in Vienna called for the coca-leaf to be "released from its house-arrest”.

The German Society for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) investigated the perspectives for such a legal marketing, where it saw a good chance for tea, though not for most of the other products. The limited market in Bolivia and Peru, according to the GTZ study, does not offer any attractive presentation in suitable jars, tins or tubes. A general global analysis was not seen as viable in view of the legal position obtaining at the present time. A paper of the World Health Organisation WHO of March 1995 states: "The consumption of coca-leaves appears to have no negative effects, but positive therapeutic, religious and social functions for the peoples of the Andes.”

Nevertheless "coca-diplomats” like Evo Morales have always been disparaged as the fifth column of the drug trade – and the initiative of the Society for Threatened Peoples was at the time a very brave one indeed. When the Bolivian government wanted to present coca products at the World Exhibition in Seville in 1992 the sample was impounded by the Spanish customs. Nor was the friendly support of Felipe Gonzales and Francois Mitterand of any avail. The coca diplomacy finally broke down in the second half of the 1990s. Yet in the light of the continuing fiasco of the war against drugs in the Andes their arguments have lost none of their plausibility. A government under Evo Morales will fight again for the decriminalisation of the coca-leaf both in Bolivia and at the United Nations. It would be a wise move - and Morales has expressed this intention in his first statements following the election – to find a sensible regulation of coca farming. Not only in order to avoid bringing down the international community on top of them, but also because coca farming and the illegal processing to cocaine is partly linked with serious environmental problems. Morales has said that he intends to fight the power centres of the drug trade, not the farmers.

Robert Lessmann is a freelance journalist and consultant. In the years 1989/1990 he worked for the German section of the GfbV. His book "Zum Beispiel Bolivien” (Lamuv-Verlag, Göttingen 2004) contains besides up-to-date analyses of the situation in the country also an extensive portrait of Evo Morales. Further information on coca and cocaine can be found in: Robert Lessmann: "Zum Beispiel Kokain”, Lamuv-Verlag, Göttingen 2001.